MV VANCOUVER VICTORY

IMO NO: 8010843

Collision

Location: Singapore Bunkering anchorage

Date of casualty: 02 April 2009

Summary

On 02 April 09, the day of the incident bulk carrier MV Vancouver Victory was receiving diesel oil from a barge alongside on starboard side and provisions from a supply boat on port side at Singapore Eastern Bunkering Anchorage. A part crew was attending to bunker operation and others were receiving stores and provisions. Another bunker barge to supply fuel oil was approaching the vessel on port side.

The OOW who was keeping anchor watch was also attending to various other activities. Both RADARS were off as technicians were on main mast for necessary repairs.

At 2230hrs, the OOW who was on the bridge saw a vessel approaching very close and passing from port to starboard bow. At this time he flashed signaling lamp towards the approaching vessel and informed the master about the situation. The other vessel did not respond to signals made and continued approaching closer.

By the time Master reached the Bridge, the approaching vessel had already collided. The starboard side gang way area of other vessel had collided with port side fore castle.

After collision other vessel continued on her way without any concern and response. The ship was identified as MV JIA HUA.

Causal Factors

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- There was no dedicated look out on Bridge as watch keeper AB was engaged in receiving stores and OOW was attending to various activities including anchor watch keeping. The OOW was not alert and attentive while keeping anchor watch and saw the approaching vessel only at eleventh hour when she was too close.
- The efficiency of OOW was affected due to distraction caused by multitasking.
- The OOW ignored various Bridge procedures which were required of a competent watch keeper.

A.I.S. was not monitored to check course and speed of that ship including the CPA and TCPA to assess risk of collision.
Ship's whistle was not used to alert or draw attention of approaching vessel.
VHF was not used to call, alert or to know intention of approaching vessel.

RADARS were not used to asses for an early warning of risk of collision **a**s both Radars were switched off and one of the radar was under repair**s.**
VTS was not informed about vessels radars being under repair, accordingly to warn other passing by vessels.
Master was informed at the eleventh hour while the situation was almost out of control.
Emergency alarm was not raised to muster crew for contingency.

- **Risk assessment** was not carried out while creating a critical situation due to non availability both Radars.
- **The effect of tide** on the other vessel and subsequent set and drift towards own vessel was not foreseen and taken into consideration.
- **COLREG Violation: The vessel violated COLREG Rule 5 &7.**

M.V.JIA HUA

- The OOW was not able to detect warnings of imminent danger, provided by MV Vancouver Victory by flashing signal light. This **indicated** lack of attention and inadequate look out.
- OOW did not track or monitor either own vessel or target vessels for risk of collision by making use of any bridge equipment available and remained unaware of the existing situation till collision took place.
- **Set and Drift not assessed and allowed for:** The vessel was navigating the area during peak of flood tide. The peak of flood tide was at 2300hrs with a rate of 1.6-1.7 knots setting to a direction of 235º T, almost south westerly and the vessel which was heading south east was more or less broad on to tidal current and thus being bodily drifted in a south westerly direction towards MV Vancouver Victory and was left unmonitored, unnoticed, unattended for some time till it resulted in this collision.
- **COLREG Violation: the vessel violated COLREG Rule 5, 7, 8 & 16.**

Lessons Learnt

- Look out must be maintained by all vessels at all the times as per Rule 5 of COLREG.
- Every Vessel must make use of all available human and technical resources and monitor the progress of Own vessel and target vessels when navigating in dense traffic.
- All imminent dangers and risks must be identified. The risk of collision must be determined and action must be taken in ample time.
- The effect of tide and current on the vessel must be determined using any means and accordingly set and drift to be allowed for.
- The execution of all operations on ship must be done strictly in compliance to specified SMS procedures.
- The passage planning must be addressed with special precautions in critical operations, such as non-availability of Radar in areas of heavy traffic.
- Crew must be instructed to carry out dedicated jobs and multitasking must be avoided to cause any distraction.
- Emergency preparedness and Training standards of the shipboard crew must be improved.