

M.V. SIAM BRIDGE


IMO NO. 9140061

Collision

Location: Yangtze (Shanghai River), China

Date of casualty: 22 June 2009

Summary



Container vessel, MV Siam Bridge completed cargo loading at Shanghai and as the vessel left the berth and merged in traffic lanes MV Maritime Anita was spotted on Radar about 6 cables on her port bow at speed of 10.8 knots.

The Bridge team comprised of Pilot, Master, OOW and helm's man. Vessel was on hand steering and visibility poor, only about a cable, due to fog. It was flood tide.

Pilot speeded up the vessel to navigation full ahead to catch up with high tide since he was transiting through south channel (shallow water), which did not sound convincing to Master.

The vessel overtook MV Maritime Anita keeping her on port side. After overtaking she cut across her bow from starboard to port and a little later she again crossed her bow from port to starboard. At this movement, one minute before the collision, MV Maritime Anita reduced speed to slow ahead, dead slow ahead and later stopped engine.

This alteration of course resulted in close quarter situation and at 2200 hrs M.V Siam Bridge made contact of her starboard quarter to port bow of M.V. Maritime Anita.

Engine room of MV Siam Bridge flooded and the section of bow, bulbous bow and fore peak tank of MV Maritime Anita was damaged. Later MV Siam Bridge was towed to dockyard for repairs.

Causal Factors, on both vessels

The root cause of the incident was over reliance on competence of pilots and poor bridge resource management. Master and OOW competency was not exercised to their full potential on both vessels including Master's overriding authority on safety when in competency of pilot was apparent.

There was no dedicated look out man on both vessels.

There was no role of VTS in safety and efficiency of navigation.

There was no communication between pilot and bridge team and also between two vessels to indicate overtaking or safety of navigation or action to avoid collision.

There was an obvious lack of situational progress monitoring by not plotting the vessel and relying on visual judgment of pilot in restricted visibility.

There was no evidence of sound signal being made while in restricted visibility.

MV Siam Bridge

- COLREG Violation: the vessel violated COLREG 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 19 & 35(a)
- The decision of pilot to transit through South Channel was not objected by Master.
- The vessel was proceeding on navigation **full ahead** at a speed of 13.0knots to catch up tide and this was not safe speed.
- Both pilot and master did not realize that giving frequent helm orders “hard a port / starboard” was in fact considerably reducing the speed of the vessel and drawing her close to the vessel which she overtook earlier.
- The use of local language also contributed to communication gap.

MV Maritime Anita

- COLREG Violation: the vessel violated COLREG 2, 5,6,7,8, 19 & 35(a)
- Maritime Anita did not reduce her speed to a minimum at which she could be kept on her course, after the other vessel overtook her, to avoid close quarter situation existing most of the time.
- Efforts were not made to minimize the impact of collision using main engine or the maneuver well in time.
- The master was fatigued due to lengthy river transit.

Lessons Learnt

- The Master of any vessel should not over rely on the competence of pilots and should intervene if inappropriate actions are taken. Master is the sole in-charge of the vessel and must exercise his authority and responsibility.
- The OOW must be alert and attentive and continuously monitor the progress of the vessel by plotting and liaison with Bridge team and making use of Bridge resources.
- Master should insist on pilots to communicate only in English language.
- Efficient look out, both ahead and astern must be posted where the OOW thinks fit.
- In restricted visibility, sound signals are of importance and must be made use of.
- Every possible effort should be made to minimize the impact of collision using main engine or the maneuver if the collision is inevitable.
- MV Siam Bridge should not have overtaken the vessel at first place considering the congested traffic lanes and restricted visibility.
- Risk assessment is a continuous process and must be reviewed if the circumstances change or there are indications of greater risk than initially assumed.
- VTS must not hesitate to give pre-warning or guidance to maritime traffic if there is any doubt on safety of navigation.
- The effect of tide and current on vessel’s course, speed and maneuvering characteristics should be taken into account and allowed for.
- The task and workload of Master must be such that it does not result in diminished human performance due to lengthy navigation, particularly transit of river with pilot.